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INTRODUCTION 
    There is every reason to believe that mankind has always had to cope 
with accidents and disasters. History contains many references to both 
natural and man caused disasters. Many of the earliest man-caused 
disasters were fires which often had devastating consequences. The 
experiences gained from these catastrophic fires were painful but useful in 
that they contributed to improved methods of prevention and fire fighting. 
Similarly our experience with chemical accidents can and should lead to 
safer operations. However, this process will be greatly influenced by the 
way in which we react to accidents. 
     Risk management in the chemical and process industries encompasses 
several distinct but related phases. These include worker safety, 
environmental impacts, and community impacts. Although this may seem 
elementary, for many years safety to the U.S. chemical industry basically 
meant worker safety. Worker safety is only one aspect of plant safety. 
The accidents which today may expose a company or community to the greatest 
risk may have little relationship to the traditional tenets of worker 
safety. Vapor clouds can often pass right over the plant and such releases 
may have little relationship to typical worker injuries. 
     The concept of chemical risk is now changing primarily as a result of 
several major chemical accidents resulting in significant loss of life and 
property and a greater public awareness of exposure to both acute and 
chronic chemical risk. The best known and clearly the incident with the 
greatest loss of life was the Bhopal release in late 1984. Although there 
have certainly been other serious chemical and gas accidents (Mexico City, 
Seveso, Italy, Sandoz's Basel plant) the magnitude and suddenness of Bhopal 
shocked people all over the world. That the disaster emanated from a 
manmade source has distinguished it from numerous equally serious natural 
disasters and proved a continuing fascination to those concerned about the 
impacts of modern technology. 
     During the last few years many of us have become more actively involved 
with chemical and process plant safety issues. Involvement with a number of 
different safety related studies, discussions with numerous industry 
professionals and governmental officials, participation at seminars and 
conferences and close inspection of the literature have helped give us a 
perspective on plant safety and risk management. Today we want to share 
these observations and personal opinions with you and thereby contribute in 
a small way to the development of a necessary consensus on chemical risk 
management. Because of our greater involvement with safety-related activi-
ties and initiatives in the U.S., our remarks will relate most closely to 
the U.S. situation. However, we believe that there will be numerous aspects
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of our observations 
internationally. 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
and suggested approaches that will have relevance
    The increased public focus on chemical industry operations comes 
during a period of economic upheaval for the world wide chemical industry. 
Economic development throughout the world, rising international trade 
imbalances and consequent currency exchange rate fluctuations have 
contributed to the erosion of foreign markets for U.S. producers as well as 
the development of fierce competition from both U.S. and international 
producers in the U.S. market. There has been a trend for traditional raw 
materials suppliers to develop their own processing capabilities and to 
become exporters of intermediates or products. These factors together with 
aging physical plants in many developed countries including the U.S. have 
led companies to reduce their exposure in areas of low profit margins such 
as commodity chemicals. Aging plants are being shut down rather than 
modernized. Producers in the U.S. have turned to narrower specialty areas 
in attempts to maintain economic viability.
    A decision to 
efforts in such 
economic benefits 
The driving force 
be purely economic
     Nevertheless, 
industry to devote
devote more resources to plant safety and loss prevention 
an unstable economic climate is difficult. Immediate 
are not obvious although added costs will be seen quickly. 




 to these areas
are driving the U.S. chemical
Continuing public attention and negative media coverage create an 
atmosphere which leads to pressure for additional regulation of 
the industry. Recent domestic U.S. regulatory experience (e.g., 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or the nuclear industry) 
shows a tendency toward becoming more and more prescriptive and 
bureaucratic. Innovation and improvements become more difficult 
to achieve and the permitting process becomes a seemingly endless 
activity. It  is not difficult to foresee a climate in which 
decisions to build new facilities in less regulated areas are 
easily made. Of course, since safety is an international issue, 
this option may be considerably curtailed in the future. Projects 
in which World Bank participation in financing is involved are 
already subject to formal safety studies.
Increasing costs and, in some cases, unavailability of liability 
insurance is a reality. Companies in the industry have formed 
groups to provide insurance to themselves. Deductible and self 
insurance amounts have grown larger and larger. The increasing 
tendency to go to court (especially in the U.S.) and the public's 

















institutional realities often 
nevertheless still applicable.
temper this motivation, it is
     These factors have indeed led to movement in the industry. In the U.S., 
cooperative efforts through industry and professional associations, such as 
Air Pollution Control Association (APCA), American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers (AIChE), through its new Center for Chemical Process Safety, 
American Petroleum Institute (API), and Chemical Manufacturers Association 
(CMA), have accelerated. New initiatives have been forthcoming from these 
groups, and from new organizations such as the National Institute for 
Chemical Studies, a voluntary action coalition of government, industry, and 
the public sector based in West Virginia's Kanawha Valley. For example, 
CMA's CAER (Community Awareness and Emergency Response) program and its 
expanded CHEMTREC (Chemical Transportation Emergency Center) are designed 
to improve public and industry cooperation while the National Institute for 
Chemical Studies has sponsored major meetings involving people from all 
segments of our society. The many skills and techniques required for risk 
management programs exist in the chemical and other industries and can be 
mustered when needed. Probabilistic risk assessment techniques have been 
developed and are routinely applied in the aerospace and nuclear industries 
and are now being widely adopted in the chemical industry.
     The U.S. nuclear industry provides an apt example of successful initia-
tive in the form of INPO (Institute for Nuclear Power Operation). INPO is a 
cooperative organization which was formed by nuclear utilities. It is 
strongly financed (operating budget of more than $6,000,000), staffed with 
recognized professionals and authoritative. Its purpose is to act as a 
clearinghouse for information and to improve nuclear plant safety by 
fostering and providing a broad based system of ongoing data accumulation 
and analysis leading to continuing upgrading of equipment, systems and 
procedures. There has been a perceptible reversal in the growth of the size 
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and in the number of 
rules and regulations promulgated by the NRC since INPO has become 
functional. An organization with the potential to acquire the clout of INPO 
has not yet appeared in the chemical industry. The basic structure, 
diversity, competitive nature and international status of the chemical 
industry are different and undoubtedly make the emergence of such an 
association more difficult.
    A second area of movement that is visible is in the area of individual 
corporate risk management programs. A reassessment of corporate programs is 
underway in an increasing number of companies both large and small. In 
certain cases, this is a result of individual company decisions to proac-
tively reduce the risks of doing business, while in some cases, it is more a 
result of increasing regulatory pressures.
     These developments in the industry itself are 
external factors. Two of the most important factors 
public media and governmental regulatory activities, 
following sections.
 impacted by numerous 
 , the treatment by the 
 are discussed in the
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EFFECTS OF MEDIA COVERAGE 
    Certainly the reaction to Bhopal and other plant accidents is different 
now than it would have been in an earlier age. The developments in 
electronics and global communications have enabled the media to bring the 
horrors of the Bhopal accident to our immediate attention.  Environmental 
groups and others concerned with the impacts of modern technology have 
already done much to cause the public to be distrustful of industry and 
technology. Furthermore, the timing of Bhopal itself seems to have come at 
a time when environmental groups and the media especially in the U.S. were 
looking for a new issue. The total lack of any newly started nuclear power 
projects in the U.S. has reduced the media's preoccupations with nuclear 
power while the similarity between chemical plant accidents and hazardous 
waste problems has tended to intensify the interest in anything chemical. 
Indeed similarities between the invisible nature of certain toxic atmospher-
ic releases and equally invisible radiation may aggravate the situation. 
Newspaper surveys performed after Bhopal but before Chernobyl indicated that 
the number of news articles dealing with chemical effects exceeded the 
number of articles dealing with nuclear power. 
    This intense media barrage is really autocatalytic and leads to the 
extensive coverage and magnifications of even very minor accidents. All of 
which over time tends to create in the public mind an impression that the 
situation is rapidly worsening when in reality it may only be the coverage 
that is rapidly increasing. The result can be to make what is a real but 
manageable problem, into one that is perceived by the public as a crisis 
requiring draconian measures. 
     In this type of an environment anyone associated with the chemical 
industry must be very careful in their responses or public utterances. Too 
casual or not fully supported assurances of safety may be immediately 
comforting but can later result in a devastating backfire. The mid-1985 
accident at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Institute, West Virginia 
illustrates this fact. Although there were no obvious long term or 
extremely serious health impacts from this accident, the mere fact that it 
occurred after Union Carbide had publicly indicated that Bhopal type 
disasters were almost inconceivable in their domestic plants was 
embarrassing and extremely damaging to the public confidence. The incident 
illustrates that safety and risk management is indeed an international 
issue. 
     Public opinion will ultimately determine the extent of governmental 
regulation of the U.S. Chemical industry. Increased regulation is probably 
inevitable. Many in the chemical industry feel that a certain degree of 
regulation may even be beneficial but only if applied fairly and in the mood 
of cooperation rather than in an adversarial manner. The ultimate fairness 
and intelligence of the media will be influential in the shaping of this 
public opinion. The process industries must learn to deal effectively with 




     In the U.S., government initiatives have been slow in developing . This 
may have been a result of a realization of the complexity of the chemical 
and process industries, their importance to the nation and the economic 
difficulties facing the United States chemical industry. On the other hand , 
the slowness of governmental response could represent a real lack of under-
standing of what to do and how to finance it. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has shown reluctance to leap in with major new 
safety programs and is no doubt acutely aware of its lack of extensive 
chemical safety expertise. 
    At the date of this writing federal legislative activity has centered 
on right-to-know and emergency preparation legislation designed to identify 
potential chemical hazards to the public and to help the public prepare for 
accidents. The difficulty here is that the public will generally lack the 
technical knowledge required to evaluate these data and make informed 
judgements. It is quite probable that right-to-know legislation only 
represents the beginning of a more comprehensive legislative program. The 
result of this initial federal activity has been the passage of Title III of 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act known as the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. This act establishes data 
reporting requirements and a structure and schedule for statewide emergency 
planning covering all facilities handling extremely toxic materials. Key 
deadlines in this act occur throughout 1987 and 1988. 
    EPA's major contribution to date has been to develop and publish a list 
of nearly 400 acutely toxic chemicals along with guidelines designed to 
instruct communities on how to inform themselves about chemical risks and 
how to initiate emergency preparedness programs. The Emergency Planning and 
Right-To-Know Act have really encoded these EPA activities and given them 
the force of law.
    Most state activities have also dealt with right-to-know legislation or 
emergency planning requirements. The most comprehensive state law has been 
enacted in New Jersey which contains one of the heaviest concentrations of 
process facilities in the U.S. The bill is entitled the "Toxic Catastrophe 
Prevention Act" or Baer Bill after its legislative sponsor. The bill 
initially addressed only eleven "extraordinary hazardous" chemicals but 
included a provision for expansion of this list by mid-1987, which is now 
being implemented. Nearly 100 additional chemicals are to be covered. The 
ultimate goal of the bill is to ensure that every company handling the 
specified compounds has an approved Risk Management Program. In the absence 
of an approved program the bill requires the performance of an accident risk 
assessment by an independent third party selected by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection. Recently proposed implementing 
regulations have spelled out the elements of an acceptable risk management 
program. Key elements would cover procedures, training, equipment, 
maintenance, testing, emergency responses, mitigation techniques, hazard 
identification, and hazard analyses. The program proposed by New Jersey is 
extemely comprehensive and prescriptive and will require major expenditures 
and commitments by New Jersey industry. Serious civil and criminal 
penalties are proposed and more than 900 facilities will be impacted.
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     New Jersey's program has received considerable attention from other 
state environmental agencies. Other states are proceeding very cautiously. 
California has recently enacted a similar risk management bill calling for 
registration of acutely hazardous materials and the preparation of a Risk 
Management and Prevention Plan. The effectiveness with which New Jersey and 
California implement these acts will have considerable impact on the shaping 
of both state and national regulatory programs.
RISK MANAGEMENT
     Our observations convince us that we have 
and that industry must take action if it is to 
have briefly mentioned the two pronged approach 
in the form of an INPO-like organization and at 
in the form of a risk management program.
passed the point of no return 
 control its own destiny. We 
 - at the industry-wide level 
 the individual company level
     The emergence of risk management programs while voluntary, has been 
partially motivated in some cases by regulatory requirements or by a desire 
to stave off additional regulatory action. The developing framework often 
incorporates and integrates elements of practices which had previously been 
established.
    What are the characteristics that a 
should have? We would propose:



















organized and thorough 
 understandable and address
be do-able and economical 
be based on existing technology 






     The first three points are closely related and reinforce one another. 
The clearer it can be made that the program is comprehensive and open, the 
more support it will generate from interested parties. This aspect of the 
program must go beyond the requirements of "Right-To-Know" laws in so far as 
it will do more than identify hazardous  materials, it must also identify 
plausible potential scenarios for accidental releases, the consequences of 
such releases and the mitigative actions taken or planned. This will pose 
a burden on companies which are using proprietary technology in their 
processing operations. It will require that documentation which is made 
available to the public be carefully screened to present information in a 
manner which is forthcoming and avoids the appearance of being a cover-
up.




Control or Treatment Responses
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Procedures - Operating 
            - Maintenance 
           - Testing and Inspection 





    A careful examination of what is meant by each of these elements 
follows:
Hazard Identification:
     Mechanisms must be established to ensure rigorous comprehensive review 
of the material handled at the facility, the equipment used and the 
operations and procedures utilized. The results of this review should be 
documented and saved for future reference and use, for example, when a 
change is being made in the process or operation. Typical techniques which 
are applicable include use of checklists, HAZOP studies, fault tree 
analysis, or Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
     All of these procedures have their advantages and disadvantages. There 
is no one universally correct or preferable choice of methodologies. The 
selection of a hazard identification technique for any particular process 
depends on a number of factors. Obviously, the stage of development of the 
process is critical. Different methodologies could be used during the 
conceptual design, construction or operating phases of a process. Screening 
and ranking methodologies are most appropriate in the early stages of 
process development. Typical approaches include Preliminary Hazard Analyses 
or the use of hazard checklists or indices such as  Dow-Mond. These are 
strictly experience based approaches and help to establish relative levels 
of hazardousness for a process. 
    More exacting and methodical methods such as Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis, What If Analyses, or Hazard and Operability studies allow for a 
more structured approach to hazard identification as well as facilitating 
the use of creativity and imagination. These techniques are most 
appropriately performed in the latter stage of design or during operation of 
a process. They depend on more developed information and documents such as 
Piping and Instrumentation Drawings. These approaches are more likely to 
uncover unusual or unexpected events that although low in probability of 
occurrence have potentially severe consequences. Their use is also more 
manpower intensive and requires the expenditure of greater time and money.
     Mathematical and probability techniques such as Fault Tree or Event 
Tree Analyses can be very forceful tools but require even more expertise and 
resources. These probabilistic methods are particularly good for reviewing 
complex processes and interacting system. Where a sufficient data base 
exists they can lend to quantitative estimates of the frequency of certain 
accidents.
    The important thing from the programmatic standpoint is 
appropriate methods of hazard identification are applied to
to ensure that 
new processes
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and modified projects and on some periodic basis to operating processes. 
Furthermore, the choice of methodologies should follow from a considered 
evaluation of all relevant factors. 
    Both the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the American Institute 
of Chemical Engineer's Center for Chemical and Process Safety have prepared 
extensive guidelines to help in the selection of an appropriate hazard 
identification technique. Internationally, the World Bank has also prepared 
a manual to assist in the performance of hazard evaluations. 
Consequence Analysis: 
     The consequences of undesired events identified in hazard evaluation 
procedures must also be determined. With the exception of rough screening 
analyses, consequence analysis is site specific; it must consider the type 
of hazard involved, site location, population density and prevailing weather 
patterns. The consequences to be determined will include both health and 
economic effects. For explosions, pressure wave radii can be calculated; 
for fires, fireball radii and thermal radiation values vs. distance; for 
toxic releases, airborne concentrations as a function of distance or 
potential drinking water concentrations. 
     Consequence analysis is an important part of a risk management program 
because risk really is a function of the probability of occurrence of an 
event and the consequences of the event. Therefore, the management of risk 
associated with an identified hazard requires the best possible 
understanding of the consequences of the particular hazard. Thus, for all 
but the most obviously serious hazards or those that have easy or relatively 
inexpensive fixes good consequence analysis is nearly as important as 
identifying the hazard. 
    Treatment of this subject is not within the scope of this paper but it 
is worth noting that good accurate modeling or simulation in a realistic 
fashion is very difficult. Atmospheric dispersion is not readily duplicated 
in a laboratory and is even more difficult to reduce to analytical terms. 
Efforts in this direction will be increased as the magnitude of both risks 
and mitigation costs are better understood. 
Control or Treatment: 
     Means used to control potential releases or their consequences to the 
environment must be identified. These could include provision for scrubbing 
systems to neutralize or remove hazardous components, flare systems or 
incinerators to destroy hazardous compounds or even secondary containment 
devices to temporarily hold the hazardous material until it is further 
processed prior to release. Numerous guides and texts exist that can aid 
the engineer in the selection of appropriate equipment or process changes. 
The principles involved are similar to those encountered in the development 
and operation of processes. Indeed the optimum solution often involves 
process modification rather than add-on hardware. The real importance of 
singling out this step is to assure that appropriate action is taken on 
every identified hazard.
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Procedures:
    The implementing procedures must be consistent with plant safety 
programs. Operating procedures must address issues revealed in the hazard 
identification step. Maintenance, testing, and inspection procedures must 
address hardware items which have been determined to be critical from a 
safety viewpoint. A preventive maintenance system which identifies trends 
in equipment failures should be in place to provide feed forward data. 
Proper procedures may be the most economical and in some cases the only 
practical way of managing a particular risk. 
     Change Control is an area which cannot be over emphasized in a risk 
management program. It must control changes no matter how seemingly minor, 
it must maintain documentation and drawings in a current condition and it 
must provide for a hazard analysis as part of any change (documentation 
prepared in the Hazard Identification step is useful here). To be 
successful this cannot be just a paper program. It must be truly a 
controlled process and can only work with complete management commitment.
Training: 
     A recent study of accidents in petroleum processing and storage 
facilities has revealed that roughly two-thirds of the accidents were due to 
human error rather than to hardware failure or design deficiencies. The 
best procedures are worthless paper if people are not trained to understand 
their intent and proper implementation. Periodic refresher training must be 
carried on as operators or procedures change. Again these cannot be mere 
rubber stamp courses; serious weight must be given to these courses and they 
must be integrated into a coordinated program in an atmosphere of corporate 
commitment.
Emergency Planning: 
    Despite the best efforts of plant designers, equipment suppliers and 
operators, zero risk is an unattainable goal and accidents will occur. 
Results of the consequence analysis can be used to prepare contingency plans 
which must be in place. Personnel must be trained in what actions they are 
required to take in the occurrence of pre-determined scenarios. Channels of 
communication and coordination with local governmental and voluntary 
agencies must be established. CMA and the EPA are both quite active in this 
area and have prepared worthwhile guidelines for preparation of effective 
emergency plans. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 
1986 recently passed in the U.S. now requires nearly all companies to 
participate in the preparation, maintenance, and potential implementation of 
comprehensive emergency plans.
Accident Investigation: 
     The old saw that experience is the best teacher although trite is often 
true. However, to be an effective teacher, we must obtain accurate and 
unbiased feedback from experience. Unfortunately, an accident tends to make 
the people involved very defensive and fearful. An effective accident 
investigation procedure must be perceived as being a learning tool for 
determination of possible preventive measures rather than as a search for a
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scapegoat. Unfortunately, human nature being what is is, this is easy to 
accept in theory and often very difficult to actually put into practice. 
Nevertheless for accident or near accident investigation to work effective-
ly, management must practice what they preach. 
Audits: 
     As in any program, periodic checks are required to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the program as well as the degree of compliance. A 
management which pays lip service to safety yet concentrates its resources 
on production, is not doing itself or the industry any favors. Audits are a 
key source of feedback to management as well as a sign to personnel that the 
risk management program is to be taken seriously. 
     Audit programs can be administered in a number of ways. Again, there 
is not necessarily any one correct way. Programs can be administered from 
central audit departments or groups or run by ad hoc committees which 
utilize personnel from other plants or groups. Outside consultants can be 
used entirely or in part or some combination of all of the above can be 
used. 
CONCLUSION 
     In summary then, individual chemical and process companies must take 
safety initiatives in-house as well as out-of-house collectively through one 
or two independent industry-wide groups. The overall external effort should 
be coordinated by only a few organizations to avoid dilution of what needs 
to be a substantial and well financed program. INPO would appear to be an 
excellent model for this type of industry group. There is little doubt in 
our minds that the development of an active external organization with both 
independence and some meaningful level of authority is required to reverse 
the loss of public confidence and avoid the creation of a cumbersome and 
stifling new regulatory program. 
     All responsible companies must adopt, implement and eventually 
institutionalize an effective corporate risk management program. No one 
should realistically expect any long term resolution of either the preceived 
or real problem of chemical risks to come from anywhere but within the 
industry. The industry can utilize analysis techniques developed in other 
industries and establish organizations modeled on those used successfully in 
other fields, but must eventually adopt these mechanisms to fit the chemical 
industry. 
    To proceed with both of these simultaneous initiatives, the industry 
has to achieve a real and substantial concensus. The costs incurred through 
application of a comprehensive risk management program must be accepted as a 
necessary cost of doing business and serve as an incentive to design 
processes and plants that are inherently safer. It is entirely possible 
that the careful adherence to safety principles may, in the long term, 
reduce wastes and improve productivity. The alternative to concerted 
industry efforts in the U.S. is almost certainly going to be an enactment of 
an extensive and inefficient regulatory program.
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